EuHEA Seminar series in fall
It is a pleasure to announce the newly launched EuHEA 2020 Seminar Series. Due to the cancellation of the in-person conference in Oslo earlier this year, the chairmen of Oslo’s scientific committee, Oddvar Kaarboe and Pedro Pita Barros, kindly agreed to organize a weekly online seminar, with the support of the countries’ representatives, inviting selected presenters who submitted their papers to the original conference. We are happy to announce that the program of the seminar has now been finalized.
For details about the program, see here.
In order to participate in the seminar, we kindly ask you to register here.
The first seminar will take place next Thursday, September 17, 2020, from 14.00 to 15.00 (CET).
Title: Competition, reputation and feedback in health care markets: Experimental evidence
Presenter: Thomas Rittmannsberger, University of Innsbruck ([log in para visualizar])
Category: Experimental health economics
Discussant: Geir Godager, University of Oslo ([log in para visualizar])
A key characteristic of health care markets is the information asymmetry between patients and physicians. While patients have to trust in physicians that they receive appropriate treatment, physicians may exploit their informational advantage resulting in overtreatment, undertreatment and/or overcharging. This is why health services are often referred to as credence goods. The provision of feedback on rating platforms and the associated reputation building has gained more and more attention in the past two decades in the context of physician-patient interactions. We capture these recent developments and investigate whether reputation building and the provision of feedback to physicians can help reduce mistreatment in health care with the use of a laboratory experiment.
In a credence goods framework, five conditions of market interactions with 240 undergraduate students were conducted. The conditions vary with respect to the degree of reputation building. In the baseline condition (B), patients and physicians are matched randomly and cannot identify their interaction partners. In all other conditions physicians can build reputation since interaction partners can be identified. In condition R patients and physicians are matched randomly, while patients can choose their physician in RC. Based on RC, two additional conditions allow patients to rate their interaction with the physician on a 5-star rating system. In RC-FB-Private only the rated physician can see the rating, while the rating is visible to all market participants in RC-FB-Public.
Our results show a significant level of undertreatment (about 40%) in the baseline condition B. Market efficiency amounts to 63%. Introducing reputation R decreases the level of undertreatment to 25%. When patients can identify phycisians and choose between them in RC, undertreatment is further significantly reduced to 7%. Allowing for feedback does not affect physician behavior compared to condition RC.